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the definition of project personnel and native counterparts,
or the receptivity of the host government. Those with a
more theoretical bent may call particular attention to the
economic, political, or socio-psychological development of
the host society.
Our own concern, in the research herein reported, has
been quite narrowly limited. We have addressed ourselves
almost exclusively to the question of how adequately Ameri-
can personnel operating overseas. have been prepared for their
experience. (Since, however, that experience is most com-
plex, involving new professional, organizational, political
and sociocultural environments,the question is not so simple
as it might first appear.) Moreover, our work has been
frankly exploratory, designed not to propose "answers" to
the problems we raise so much as to propqse, refine, and
recast a number of hypotheses which appear to offer useful
starting points for more elaborate investigations yet to be
undertaken.
The basic data input in our work has been a series of
interviews with a relatively modest number of veterans of
technical assistance programs. Because the number of inter-
viewees was small, and because, in reconstructing the ex-
periences of such people through interviews with them, we
were necessarily limited by their own biases and perceptions,
neither the results we report nor the conclusions we
imply can be taken, in any sense, as definitive. To these
limitations must be added the fact that our interviewees
do not, in any way, constitute a representative sample of
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the relevant universe. Drawn exclusively from the Cambridge
area, they are largely members of what might be termed an
"assistance elite". The projects in which they were involved
were quite probably both more meaningful and better managed
than is usual in the world of technical assistance.
Nevertheless, our explorations have served their primary
purpose. That purpose was to clarify the distinction between
the formal training relevant to overseas work and the more
general personality orientations which, according to much
informed opinion, constitute the most critical factor in
overseas performance. That neither of these is the only
variable which accounts for success or failure abroad is per-
fectly clear. Yet it is equally clear that both are necessary
conditions for success. Moreover, the substantial outpouring
of criticism that has been directed at the overseas American
suggests that they may be particularly vulnerable conditions.
While our data cast light on other aspects of the general prob-
lem, as well, it is to these that they are primarily relevant.
As indicated somewhat later in this report, the single
most interesting, and presumably most important, observation
that is suggested by our data is that there are great differ-
ences, both in background and in perception of overseas per-
formance, between non-engineers and engineers. The data are,
however, silent as to the genesis of these differences or as
to the impact of background upon performance. Especially
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as such distinctions between professional groups in general,
and between engineers and others in particular, are the sub-
jects of numerous stereotypes, whose relatioship to the
real world is open to serious question, it would be both
unfair and unwise to read more into the data than is ex-
plicitly found there* Indeed, although much of our effort
has been devoted to reasoning through several alternative
theoretical explanations of the data, scme of which may be
intellectually more plausible than others, the data them-
selves do not of fer sufficient grounds for prefering one to
another.
What~YIlows, then, is a statement of some theoretical pro-
blems involved in conceptualizing the problem; a description
of our approach to the research, both intellectual and metho-
dological; a suumary of some of the more interesting data
collected; a diecu"ssion of the possible interpretations of
the data; and, finally, some brief suggestions regarding
future research.
The Problem
We have already noted that our conception of the problem
to be investigated was rather sharply delimited. It was, never-
theless, attended by substantial definitional complexity and
conceptual ambiguity. Thus, for example, the very phrasing of
the question "How, if at all, can the training and recruitment
-5-
of personnel for technical assistance programs be improved?"
rests on the misleading assumption that these matters can be
fruitfully considered separately from the substantive projects
for which they are required. The implication is that there
exists a static relationship, in which more or less well-quali-
fied participants become involved in more or less well-run
projects. The more likely case, however, is that there is no
such thing as a well-qualified participant in the abstract,
but only with respect to a given project.
If we do attempt to assess competence with respect to
given projects rather than in abstract terms, we are forced
to ask whether the success or failure of a project may not
be a function of "fit" rather than of "pure" competence.
The problem which we face, in other words, is not necessarily
that personnel are inadequately trained, professionally or
personally, but that they are poorly allocated. In one set-
ting, it may be crucial to have people with positive orien-
tations towards public relations, with high sensitivity to
the nuances of the host culture; in another, strict adherence
to professional standards and a disregard for the job of
"winning friends" may be more appropriate. Which combina-
tions of technical skill and personality predispositions are
most functional in any given setting depends, of course, on
how the specific project is defined.
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Yet the definition of a project is still more complex than
the definition of competence. In our own early thinking on
these issues, we assumed a relatively fixed set of competencies,
ranging from the narrowly professional to broader, personality
oriented variables, such as adaptiveness, change orientttion,
cosmopolitanism, and the like, all these engaged in a deter-
minable organizational environment and a determinate set of
tasks. In elaborating this simple model, adding variables of
hypothesized importance, we were troubled by the apparent
fact that we lacked a dependent variable. We seemed instead
to be dealing with a highly expandable list of independent
and intervening variables leading everywhere and nowhere.
The obvious answer was to use the quality of overseas per-
formance as the dependent variable. But how do we measure
that quality? The problem is not only that "objective" apprai-
sals are expensive and difficult to obtain, requiring, as it
were,on-site inspection. More troublesome is the fact that
for most projects, either a precise statement of goals or
precise measures of achievement (or both) are lacking. But
without them, the notion of successful performances is vir-
tually useless. There are, of course, some reasonably straight-
forward programs (e.g., building a bridge or inoculating a
population), but these are somewhat less interesting as ob-
jects of study, and even they include secondary goals frequently
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unstated in the official prospectus and unmeasurable by con-
ventional criteria. In the case of "institution-building" pro-
grams, typically involving the teaching of new skills (not
necessarily technical), or in examining long-term research
programs, the problem is still more difficult.
One response is to ask the participants. But which of
the participants should be asked, and how much credence given
their reports? American personnel may confuse good public
relations with meaningful contribution, or demonstrable short-
term results with fundamental change. The hosts may be enthu-
siastic over relatively superficial innovations, or reject
as failures threatening recommendations. It is not simply
that the self-interest of the participant makes his own defi-
nition of success or failure suspect, although that in itself
poses a serious problem; more important still is that we
simply do not have a ready set of evaluative criteria. And
this problem touches the "objective" observer as much as it
does the participant.
This does not mean, of course, that projects cannot be
evaluated. It does mean that their evaluation is quite a
complex task, and far beyond the scope of the present research.
Indeed, the discovery of some efficient means of evaluation
is quite probably sufficiently difficult to warrant a sub-
stantially separate research program devoted exclusively to
that task.
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It means also that a simplistic model of linear relation-
ships, set of competencies flowing directly into project
settings, will not do. While we do not yet know what makes
a man able to do a given job well--presumably, some appropriate
mix of personality, general background, specific competence,
and motivation--whatever the actual components that prove re-
levant, we ought not to assume that any one mix will prove
universally relevant, or, for that matter, that it will even
consist always and everywhere of the same components. Thus
knowledge of the host language, or innovativeness, or exper-
tise may be useful in some settings, irrelevant in others,
dysfunctional in still others.
These general conceptual problems set the outer limits
on what we have been able to do. More constricting limits
still were provided by the purpose of our research endeavor,
which was, as noted earlier, exclusively exploratory, and by
the strategies best suited to that purpose. No pretense is
made here that the problem of personnel competence has been
comprehensively investigated, let alone "solved." Our inten-
tion was simply to probe here and there, in an attempt to
define what might be fruitful areas, both substantive and
methodological, for more substantial investigations in the
future, and to derive a number of hypotheses which seemed to
offer reasonably promising starting points for more ambitious
endeavors. No statistical tests of significance have been
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applied to our findings, nor would it have been appropriate
to do so. Indeed, we should prefer to think in terms of
"suggestions" rather than "findings". Yet, lest this caveat
be taken too seriouslyit is also worth noting that the results
do point in fairly clear directions, and are offered without
apology. Less than conclusive, they are more than intuitive.
The Method
The tactical assumption which guided our work was that
one could learn something of the problems of personnel in
technical assistance programs from people who had participated
in those programs. A retrieval study of this kind automati-
cally limits the reliability of the information obtained,
because memories are faulty, egos are weak, and perspectives
are narrow. At the same time, it is an exceedingly efficient
place from which to begin one's serach, since it is so much.
less costly than field work at project sites. Nor is the in-
formation obtained, as we shall see, without value.
It was, therefore, to a group of scientists and engineers
in the Greater Boston area, all of whom had had some appro-
priate overseas involvement, that our questionnaire was
administered. That questionnaire was developed in terms of
2our own early conceptualization of the problem. Simply stated,
we were interested in determining what factors might be rele-
vant to the perception of success or failure in his task by
'For a list of respondents, by place of employment, nature and
site of overseas assignment, see Appendix I.
2.The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix II.
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the overseas worker. Because of the limits of the scope of
our research, we were not able to go beyond individual per-
ceptions, or to match perceptions against some independent
assessment of success. Instead, we took as our starting point
an individual with three relevant characteristics--per-
sonality, cultural background, and professional ability and
experience.
With respect to personality, we were interested in such
(overlapping) variables as adaptiveness and rigidity, cosmo-
politanism and localism, neophilia and neophobia. (These some-
times fuzzy concepts were later to be replaced. by a dichotemy
whose components we have called "structophilia" and "structo-
phobia", of which more later.)
Cultural background refers to a more diffuse set of varia-
bles, including mass media consumption habits, social science
background, and knowledge of various aspects of the host
culture.
Professional ability and experience, largely self-explana-
tory, includes also prior experience, either in this country
or abroad, in a consulting capacity.
A second class of information had to do with the project
itself. What were its goals, how was it organized, by whom
was it sponsored, where was it located? This class was then
broadened to include information on the respondent's interac-
tion with the project: How was he recruited? What were his
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specific assignments? How specific were they, and how use-
ful did he think they were? What non-professional demands
were made of him, explicitly or implicitly? What was his re-
lationship to the sponsoring agency, to native project per-
sonnel, and to the host culture generally? How does he him-
self evaluate the success of the project, and according
to what criteria? How does he evaluate his own perfor-
mance -
The assumption, of course, is that there is sme correla-
tion between responses to the first class of data, dealing with
the respondent himself, and the second, dealing with the respon'.
dent in the context of his overseas assignment. (We have al-
ready pointed out some of the difficulties involved here, not
the least of which is the lack of an independent measure of
the accuracy of responses regarding the respondent in the pro-
ject. A brief example will illustrate this point: Suppose
that we are interested in the variable "job ambiguity", on
the grounds that certain kinds of people will be unable to
operate efficiently in poorly structured situation. We
hypothesize that there is a correlation between the personality
variable "structophobia vs. structophilia" and ability to
operate in ambigious settings. fit does not matter, in this
illustration, whether the hypothesis is reasonable or not.7
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Now we are confronted with the problem that a person who
cannot operate efficiently in an unstructured situation may
well proceed to reduce its threatening character by imposing
on it a structure of his own. His structuring may be highly
"inaccurate" if measured against the goals of the project
planners, but that does not matter to him, since these goals
are, by definition, unclear. Further, given his structuring
of the situation, he may perceive himself, and even the
project, as having been successful, when it was in fact a
massive failure. At the same time, the structophile, who is
most comfortable in relatively unstructured situations, will
be more apt to report ambiguities, presumably somewhat more
successful in adapting his own behavior to project require-
ments, and therefore more frequently successful in such
settings. Yet, because of his own perception of ambiguity,
he may also be somewhat more hesitant about calling his own
work, or the project as a whole, successful.
The original instrument included an adaptation of Milton
Rokeach's rigidity test 3, but it soon became apparent that
the informality of the interview setting, in which respon-
dents were drawn out and frequently treated as informants
rather than interviewees, made it uncomfortable to administer
so formal a set of questions. What we have learned of per-
sonality correlates of overseas performance, therefore, comes
3
'See Milton Rokeach, The Open & Closed Mind (New York; Basic
Books, 1961).
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out of other, less structured questions, and is based as much
on inference as on firm evidence.
Data
The 65 respondents to whom the interview schedule was
administered are marked by their diversity. They include 29
from various departments at M.I.T., 17 from Harvard (primarily
the School of Public Health), 10 from the Arthur D. Little
Company, whose major overseas involvement is in management
consulting, and nine from Stone and Webster, Inc., engaged in
large-scale engineering projects abroad. The primary principle em-
ployed in the selection of these people was the availability
and their diversity, rather than an attempt at a statistically
representative group. The extent of the diversity among them
may be seen in the following summary:
AGE:
Thirty-two per cent were under 35.
Twenty-five per cent were between 35 and 49.
Thrity-one per cent were over 50.*
RANK:
Fourteen per cent were low-ranked in their profession.
Twenty per cent were middle-ranked.
Thirty per cent were high-ranked.
PRIOR FOREIGN TRAVEL:
Fifty-nine per cent had travelled abroad before, and 33
per cent has travelled in a professional capacity.
Thirty-two per cent had never travelled abroad before.
* Where totals add to less than one hundred per cent, the
remainder consists of residual categories and/or N.A.'s
-14-
SOCIAL SCIENCE BACKGROUND:
Forty-four per cent had some background in the social
sciences.
Forty per cent had no social science background.
CONSULTING EXPERIENCE:
Forty-eight per cent had some consulting experience.
Forty-two per cent had no consulting experience.
PRIOR CONTACT WITH THE HOST COUNTRY:
Forty-eight per cent had some prior contact with the host
country, either through earlier visits, acquaintance
with natives, research, etc.
Forty per cent had no prior contact with the host country.
OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT**
Twenty per cent worked as top managers.
Thirty-four per cent worked at middle managements levels.
Thirty-four per cent worked as technicians, with no
policy responsibilities at all.
Eight per cent were consultants to foreign governments
or companies.
Similarly, there was great variance in both the nature of
the overseas projects in which respondents were involved, as
well as in their reactions to the overseas experience. The
projects were located in twenty-seven different countries,
ranging from Yugoslavia to Uganda, from Trinidad to Turkey,
and they included, among others, a study on obesity for the
World Health Organization, an evaluation of an edible oil in-
dustry to determine whether it was a reasonable prospect for
foreign investment, organizing a crystallography section in a
local physics laboratory, supervising the construction of a
transmission line across the Bosporus, research on epidemic
typhus, and establishing field accounting procedures on a con-
struction job.
** Where respondents had had several overseas assignments, it
was the most recent which formed the basis for the interview.
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Only twelve per cent of the respondents knew the language
of the host country, but only an equal number were bothered by
their lack of language skill. The rest found that English,
and possibly a smattering of the native tongue, were sufficient.
Twenty-eight per cent had very little contact with Americans
while abroad; twenty-nine per cent spent most of their time
with their compatriots. Thirty-five per cent spent most of
their free time in essentially private activities--photography,
sight-seeing, reading, and the like, thirteen per cent spent
most of it with other Americans, and twenty-one per cent mostly
with host country natives. Over a third had virtually no
contact with the indigenous population except through the
project itself.
Prior to their departure, over a third of the respondents
had a clear conceptionof what their assignment was to entail,
but twenty-one per cent were uncertain. (For most of the
rest, the question was irrelevant, usually because the assign-
ment was inherently unclear.) Slightly over half felt no
sense of discomfort during the initial period abroad, but forty
per cent did have adjustment problems.
At the same time, certain questions elicited a substantial
consensus. Thus three-fourths of all respondents enjoy foreign
travel, and the rest do not object to it; eighty-three per cent
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enjoyed the non-professional aspects of their tour of duty;
sixty-five per cent felt that their work had been successful
and only eighteen per cent were unsure of its success or felt
that it had failed. On two questions dealing with non-pro-
fessional requirements for successful work overseas, the
one answer most frequently given was some version of empathy--
knowing how to get along with other people, understanding
foreign cultures, and such.
In general, the marginal results point to a picture of high
self-satisfaction, few problems of adjustment, either to the
host culture or to the new job, few perceived difficulties or
tensions. It is almost as if we were dealing with a different
world from that which has constituted the basis for much of
the concern with technical assistance programs in the past.
Gone were the frustrations, the self-doubts, the antagonisms,
the general malaise. In their stead was a series of almost
shockingly sanguine judgments--no need to learn the language,
English is enough--no trouble with the hosts, they understood
and cooperated--no problem with housing, health, living condi-
tions generally--no problems in understanding what the job
was about, or why it was needed-- no difficulties in getting
the job done. Here and there, this near euphoric portrait
was pocked by mild disclaimer, but even the disclaimers dis-
played none of the real aggravation we had expected to find.
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Our expectations seemed so well-founded that we were
reluctant to discard them and to accept at face value the
radically different impression our data evoked. Moreover,
the number of ways in which that impression could be explained
without doing violence to the prevailing consensus of experts
in the field was large indeed. One obvious possibility was
that we had not asked the right questions, had not probed
deeply enough. Another was the possibility that the elite
status of our Cambridge-based respondents made them unrepre-
sentative of the universe of personnel or experience in techni-
cal assistance programs. Nor could we omit the possibility
that there was a systematic distortion of the facts, either
conscious or unconscious, in order to gloss over unpleasant
realitites or unpalatable memories.
None of these possibilites, however, could be rejected
on the basis of the data themselves. The one avenue open to
us was to explore more carefully the material already gathered,
in the hope that there might be some systematic differences
among our respondents. Perhaps academicians differed from
those who work for private businesses, or young people from
old, or engineers from scientists. Each of these, and several
other principles of differentiation, were used to organize the
data. By far the most fruitful, as well as the most satis-
factory from a theoretical standpoint, was the distinction
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between academic non-engineers, academic engineers, and non-
academicians (primarily engineers). Some of the differences
among these three groups are quite substantial; others are
merely suggestive. But all point in quite the same direction.
From Table 1, we see that these three groups differ with
respect to their evaluationof job success, the amount of inter-
action with their hosts and with Americans, their assessment
of their job as clear or unclear, and in their identification
of major organizational differences between home and overseas
environments. One further caveat must be entered here:
The number of academic engineers is quite small. It includes
ten respondents, but, since not all respondents answered all
questions, the percentage figures are sometimes based on as
few as five. Where less than five answered a particular
question, the actual number, presented in brackets, replaces
the percentage. The other two groups are larger: the N for
academic non-engineers between 34 and 16, with most of the
percentages based on an N of about 25; the N for non-academi-
cians ranges between 12 and 24, with most percentages based on
an N of about 20.
These differences may easily be explained on the basis of
the different kinds of overseas environments in which each
group operated. We know, for example, that most of the aca-
demic non-engineers (58%) were not part of any organized group
effort, but functioned as individual experts. Hence it is
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Table 1
Academic Academic
Non-Engineers Engineers Non-Academic
Job Clarity
Clear 161 50% 81%
Unclear 36 33 14
Irrelevant 48 17 5
Major Organizational
Differences
No major differin 31 13 62
More bureaucratic
abroad 56 75 --
Lack of resources
abroad 13 13 39
Contact with Americans
Most free
with Americans 38 71 67
Some or litte free
time with Americans 62 29 33
Experience of Discomforts
During Adjustment Period
Yes 31 67 52
No 69 33 48
Competence of Local
Personnel
High 32 14 59
Medium 37 29 29
Low 32 57 12
Desired Host Response
Wanted to be liked 60 (1) 29
Wanted to be respected 40 (3) 71
Evaluation of Job
Successful 73 63 90
Unsuccessful, doubtful 27 38 10
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not surprising that they had less contact with other Americans
than did the non-academicians, almost all of whom were involved
in team efforts. Nor, for the same reason, is it surprising
that the non-academicians claim that their jobs were more clearly
defined. It is perfectly plausible that the chief source of
the differences reported in Table 1 is a differences in the real
world, and not in perceptions or reactions to that world.
It is. however, also true that differences of .other kinds
exists among the three groups, differences which suggest that
it is not only the external environment which varies from group
to group, but also the kind of preparation, both specific and
general, which each brings to its task. Data which illustrate
this point are presented in Table 2. Thus the groups read
different newspapers, have different attitudes towards the
social sciences, prepare for foreign travel in a different
manner, and have different attitudes towards foreign travel.
There are two ways in which the differences observed in
Table 2 may be related to those noted in Table 1. The first
holds that there is no distortion in reporting the overseas
experience, but rather that different "kinds" of people become
involved in different "kinds" of experiences. Without, for
the moment, labelling these "kinds", it is consistent with
the data to hold that people who tend to read only local news-
papers, who tend to have little social science background and
place a low value on the social sciences, who have not tra-
velled abroad, and so on, usually become involved in overseas
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Table 2
Academic
Non-Engineers
Academic
Engineers Non-Academic
Newspapers
Cosmopolitan (e.g., N.Y.
Times, -Christian Science Monitor
Local Only
Attitude Towards Social Science
Positive
Negative
Preparation for Assignment
Culture oriented
Job or personal oriented
Prior Foreign Travel
Yes
No
Attitude Towards Foreign Travel*
Cosmopolitan
Local
Social Science Background
Much
Little
88% 100%
12
63
37
68
32
88
12
81
19
43
57
50
50
22
78
67
33
26
74 100
39%
61
22
78
38
63
29
72
56
45
17
83
* In coding responses to the question asking why the respondent
enjoyed foreign travel, those answers which stressed "breaks in
routine" or other tourist-type factors were classified as "local",
while those which emphasized the cultural benefits were classified
as"cosmopolitan."
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assignments which are clearly structured and more bureaucra-
tically organized, and which therefore have less ambigouus
criteria of success. They also experience greater discomfort
in adjusting to the new environment, and, both in order to
lessen the discomfort and because the organizational structure
allows it, their primary social contact is with other Americans.
In this view, there operates a kind of invisible hand, which
moves people with certain personal predelictions to select
careers whose requirements are consonant with those preferences.
The basic distinguishing predeliction may well be tolerance
of ambiguity, or, somewhat more generally, one's response to
the relative structure of an organizational environment.
Those who feel most comfortable in the face of a highly struc-
tured, unambiguous set of demands seek out careers which ful-
fill their personal requirements, as do those who prefer more
loosely structured, more ambigious environments. We have
called the two types "structophiles" and "structophobes."
The data contain several indications, apart from those
already in evidence, that this conceptualization in terms of
response to structure may, indeed, be a useful way to dis-
tinguish between kinds of people and between kinds of tasks.
Thus, for example, in answers to the several questions dealing
with initial reactions to the host country, two different
styles were apparent. Where some people stressed highly per-
sonal reactions (bad food, poor housing, good weather), others
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typically chose more sociologically-oriented categories of
description (the state of the economy, the rate of illiteracy).
The "personalizers" tend to be those who viewed there assign-
ments as most clear, the "generalizers" those who perceived a
great deal of -ambiguity in assignment. In other words,
structophiles are also personalizers, while structophobes are
generalizers.
The distinction between structophobe and structophile, at
first glance, seems to follow the same lines as that between
academicians and non-academicians.Yet it is in this context
that the small group of academic engineers is richly sugges-
tive. For the patterns of this group are quite different
from those of either the academic non-engineers or the non-
academicians. In some respects, they resemble the one, while
in other respects, they look more like the other. While we
fully recognize the dangers of extrapolating from such a
small number of people, it is possible that because their own
position is somewhere between tne academic world and the world
of the engineer that those who straddle both experience the
greatest discomfort in adjusting to the foreign environment and
report the lowest rate of success in their overseas mission.
The implications of this type of analysis are rather peculiar,
since what we have said suggests that all's well with the world,
with each personality type operating in an environment con-
genial to itself. What value then, has further training, the
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widening of intellectual and cultural horizons, the sensitizing
to foreign cultures? The world outside and the world inside
are in happy consonance, and well enough is best left alone.
Yet we are once more confronted by the mass of expert evi-
dence which contends that the world of technical assistance is
one of radical disorder, of missed opportunities, mounting
frustrations, and a low sense by those who participate in it,
that their efforts are efficacious. Moreover, the "invisible
hand" theory does not in itself explain why the two basic
groups should differ with respect to job success. If we pro-
pose to accept the data at face value, does this mean that
the structophobe is really less successful than the structophile?
Perhaps the answer lies in the clarity with which success may
be evaluated, thereby placing the structophobe in an environment
in which it is less certain just what success means. But it
is also possible that a very different kind of explanation can
be proferred, one which preserved the interesting distinction
between structophobe and structophile while, at the same time,
maintaining some contact with the expert judgments in the field.
That explanation would return to our earlier observation
that those for whom low ambiguity is important might be likely
to perceive less ambiguity, in order to reduce the threat to
their own stability. In this view, the difference is not so
much in the real world as in the manner in which the real
world is perceived. There is little question that our two
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basic groups differ substantially in what they bring to the
foreign setting, as expres3ed in Table 2. It is most cer-
tainly plausible that these differences themselves lead to
the differences in Table ,1, not because the actual situations
were so different but because of the responses to those situa-
tions. Such a style of explanation is, further, consistent
with what we know about dissonance reduction, selective percep-
tion, and perceptual distortion.
Our evidence is insufficient to choose between these two
explanations, each of which points in a very different direc-
tion with respect to policy. But follow-up discussions with
a number of our respondents, as well as lengthy discussion of
the two theories with several people who have substantial
experience in technical assistance programs, weigh heavily in
in favor of the second. on the basis of these discussions,
there is little doubt that the reason that perceptions of
the foreign experience differ so greatly is that those with
relatively narrow backgrounds and with a low tolerance of
ambiguity were limited in the sensitivity with which they
responded to the overseas environment. But is is quite clear
that further research is indicated, in order that the choice
between these two competing explanations may be based on
something more than the agreement of wise men.
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Since this entire discussion has bearing on policy in the
training and recruitment of personnel for overseas assignments,
it may be well to note that there is one dimension which has
played no part at all in our work in this area, but which is
highly relevant to policy-making. Quite apart from the skill
with which the job itself gets done, we might wish that those
who go abroad to work in technical assistance programs are
as sensitized as possible to their environment. Such sensiti-
vity may not have much impact on the project itself, although
there is reason to believe it would. But it assuredly affects
the value of the total experience for those who participate
in it, and hence also the net impact of cumulative foreign ex-
perience in the United States itself. No endeavor so compre-
hensive or so ambitious as the American effort in technical
assistance need limit itself to the immediately observable
and directly measureable achievement of its stated goals.
There are always secondary payoffs, and it is here that an
increased sensitivity to foreign cultures may make the greatest
difference.4
Yet even here, if the "invisible hand" theory is correct, it
may be risky or even impossible, to try to heighten sensitivity.
Impossible, because the personality correlates of sensitivity
are deeply rooted. . Risky, because it may be that some jobs are
best done by people with limited perspectives.
Again, further research is required.
4
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Conclusion
Some directions for further research on the problems
discussed here are obvious. Thus, for example, it would
clearly be useful to devise a more discriminating inter-
view schedule, and to administer it systematically to people
in several different foreign settings. So, too, interviews
with relevant people before, during, and after their partici-
pation in overseas work would certainly be helpful, as would
obtaining an independent assessment of their work from pro-
jects supervisors, colleagues, and host nationals. Case
studies of selected projects would be a meaningful adjunct
to survey research.
But two cautionary observations may be made. First, what-
ever the research strategies employed, maximum efficiency
may be achieved only by limiting the scope of the questions
whose answers we seek. Whether the appropriate central ques-
tion is the choice between-the two explanations of our data
proposed above, or some other not considered here, matters
less than graduation from the loose-knit framework of explo-
ratory research into a far more selective attack on the pro-
blem. Second, survey research is only one of the available
research techniques. It should not be the only one used,
since asking people questions is not necessarily, and cer-
tainly not always, the best way of getting answers to the ques-
tions we ask ourselves.
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Consideration might well be given the utility of gaming,
which has the virtue of being appropriate both to research
and to training. As a research technique, it would involve
selecting groups of people who have either been abroad or
who are the kinds of people who are typically sent abroad,
administering to them a background questionnaire, including
relevant personality items, and then observing their beha-
vior as they take assigned parts in a game whose scenario
would duplicate some typical assistance program setting.
Through careful varying of poayers, roles, and settings, it
may be possible to solve one of the central difficulties
which impedes research progress here. That difficulty is that
so many variables need to be considered that field research
can never quite get around the ceteris paribus problem.
Other things are never equal, or even nearly equal, in com-
paring two different projects. But they may be manipulated
into an approximation of equality in the more antiseptic
atmosphere of the laboratory.
So, too, it seems clear to us that more systematic
methods of information retrieval might be standardized among
the various agencies and organizations which sponsor much
overseas work. In AID, the problem of valid and useful de-
briefing has yet to be solved. In other agencies, its so-
lution has yet to be attempted. Nor has there been any
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effort to cumulate the vast range of experiences among
different agencies, to make it possible to add the wisdom of
returnees from AID projects in Pakistan to that of A.D.
Little returnees from Egypt to that of Ford Foundation
returnees from India.
We have been struck, in the course of our work, by the
apparent failure of project planners to make use of presently
available expert opinion regarding personnel recruitment
and training. Somewhat diffidently, we would suggest that
the collective widsom generated by research reports such as
this, by those yet to coise, and by veterans of the technical
assistance program ought to be incorporated, on an experimen-
tal basis, into the project planning process. It is, after
all, the best that is available, however deficient it remains.
And its conscious utilization would make possible more
refined and more definitive testing of some of our assumptions
than would any other method. But to that end, channels of
communication between scholar and planner would have to be
much more energetically and systematically cultivated.
Finally, we must raise the possibility that if future re-
search indicates that the overseas American is deficient in those
personal skills which will enable him to use his professional
training to best advantage, then we are forced to raise serious
questions about his domestic performance as well.The structo-phobe-
structo-phile dichotemy does not begin to be relevant at the water's
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edge, nor is there any reason to suppose that the overseas
incompetent becomes completely effective upon his return
home. There are differences, of course, but we must face
the possibility that the kinds of problems discussed here
have serious, if more diffuse, effects on the quality of job
performance in the United States itself.
We raise this issue not only because it magnifies sub-
stantially the importance of research in this area, but also
because it opens up to us the possibility of using extant
materials on domestic performance to further our understanding
of performance abroad. In order to exploit that possibility,
however, more considered attention needs to be given to the
similarities and differences between the two. Does the high
mobility of American professionals involve them in the same
kinds of problems that overseas work generates? Is the struc-
tophobe-structophile dichotemy useful in the American context?
In answering questions of this kind, we immensely broaden the
substantive scope of our research, though the theoretical scope
remains the same. We also open up what is surely the most
exciting avenue for future research.
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APPENDIX I
Respon-
dent Source*
01 MIT-SIM
02 MIT-SIM
03 MIT-Science
04 MIT-SIM
05 MIT-SIM
06 MIT-SIM
07 MIT-Econ.
08 Harvard Bus.
School
MIT-SIM
09 MIT-Science
Profession
Management
Management
Meteorology
Personnel
Management
Businessman,
Metabolic
Economist
International
transportation
Internal
medicine
Country
Nigeria
Uganda
Mexico
India
Turkey
Trinidad
India
Kenya
Pakistan
Project
Work with Rockefeller
Brothers Fund re feasibi-
lity of foreign investment
1) Work in Uganda
Development Corp.
2) Teaching
Lecture in a Government
ministry .
Ford consultant to see
about feasibility of
"Sloan type" middle
management program
Visit Middle East
Technical University
(METU)
Do WHO survey on obesity
Head of CIS in Delhi
Survey of role of
African businessmen in
life of country
(commercial)
In charge of group of
Pakistani medical men on
joint US-Pakistan survey
of health and nutriticn
of Pakistan army
10 MIT-Econ. Economist
Food processing Greece
Industrial Iraq
development,pro-
ject direction
ADL
*SIM-School of Industrial Management; ADL-Arthur
Public Health; S-W-Stone and Webster.
**CIS-M.I.T. Center for International Studies
Evaluate and appraise the
edible oil industry re
opportunities for foreign
capital investment
Recommend to Iraqi govern-
ment the development of
certain industries
D. Little; SPH-School of
11 ADL
India
12
CIS
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Respon-
dent Source
13 ADL
14 ADL
15 MIT-Science
16 ADL
17 ADL
Profession
Management,
economic
development
Management
services
Country
Egypt
Peru
Crystallography Chile
Agriculturist
Economist
Economic
development
Phillip-
pines
Nigeria
Project
Feasibility studies re
capital investment in
port industries
Identify potential busi-
ness opportunities in
fabricated metal indus-
tries re economic viability
Get physics lab going on
crystallography
Assist in establishing
agricultural credit and
marketing association
In charge of team-general
18 MIT-SIM
19 MIT-SIM
20 U.S.Rubber
21 Harvard-SPH
22 S-W
23 S-W
24 S-W
25 S-W
Chemical
engineer
Development &
manufacturing
of new products
(Polaroid)
Iraq
Nigeria
Latex hemistry Malaya
Nutritional
biochemistry
Chemical Divi-
sion-Project
Engineer
Construction
Electrical
engineer
Power plant
engineer
Thailand
Japan
Turkey
Jamaica
Brazil
Set up chemical industry
as part of industrial
development
Assistant Secretary,
Minister of Economic
Planning, Government
Northern Nigeria; match-
ing external aid to eco-
nomic needs of the country
1) Run research lab
2) Manage factory
Lab biochemist on U.S.
government survey
General supervision of
Japanese engineers and
draftsmen on completed
designs
Supervision of trans-
mission line across the
Bosporus and substations
Convert consumer elec-
trical equipment from
40 cycles to 50 cycles
Appraise electrical
properties (entire systems)
in Rio and Sao Paulo
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Respon-
dent
26
27
Source
Harvard-SPH
ADL
28 ADL
29 S-W
30 ADL
31 S-W
32 MIT-SIM
Harvard
Center for
ME Studies
33 MIT-Science
34 S-W
35 S-W
36 S-W
Profession
Physiology of
nutrition
Chemical in
dustry-indus-
trial economics
Chemical engi-
neering
Electrical
engineer; po-
wer generation
Investment
analysis
Senior mechani-
cal engineer-
steam power
Management-
business
Turkey
Nutrition
Senior Project
Engineer, pe-
tro-chemical
plants
Country
Ghana
Peru
Egypt
Korea
Greece
Pakistan
Turkey,
etc.
Central
America
Japan
Field account- Brazil
ing on construc-
tion projects
Engineer-power Brazil
plant desiqn
Project
Advise Mr.Nkrumah on
all programs of nutri-
tion, health
Analyze opportunities
in chemical industry,
incl. fertilizers
Phase II: detailed
feasibility studies of
government industries
judged possible in
Phase I
Rehabilitation of Chang
Pyong Dam and powerhouse
Determine investment
opportunities in food
processing industry
1) Appraise Pakistan
construction firm re
joint project
2)Size up projected
power station for bid
General
Establish INCAP:Insti-
tute of Nutrition for
Central America & Panama
Start up plant
Establish field account-
ing procedures on con-
struction job
Start up units 3 and 4
of Piratigua Power
Plants, Sao Paulo Light
-34-
-Respon-
dent Source
37 Harvard-SPH
38 MIT-SIM
39 MIT-Eng.
Profession
Microbiology
Management
Chemical
Country Project
Yugoslavia Research on epidemic
typhus
Tanganyika Assistant Secretary in
Dept. of Treasury; es-
tablish agency to deal
with external aid to
Tanganyikan government
India Determine feasibility of
private Indian institute
of technology
40
41 Harv-MIT Urban design
Joint Center
Urban Studiese
42 Harvard
43 MIT
44 MIT-Eng.
45 MIT
46 MIT-Eng.
47 Harvard
Research Asst.
(Nigeria Pr.)
City planning
Civil engineer
-soil
City planning
Civil engineer
-soil
Sanitary
engineer
Venezuela
Ghana
India
Venezuela
Turkey
Venezuela
Egypt
Urban designer on
physical planning staff
of the Guayana Project
Lecturer in economics
at Univ. of Ghana Lagon
(Accra)
Survey and draw plan
for new seaport and
town for government
Settlement Corp.
Consultant to Creole
Petroleum on dam
construction
Consultant to Turkish
Ministry of Planning in
setting up Regional
Planning Agency
Consultant to Creole
Petroleum on dam
construction
Consultant to sanitary
engineering research
center--setting.it up,
getting lab equipment--
Alexandria University
Respon-
dent
48
-35-
Source
MIT
49 MIT
50 MIT
51 Harvard Bus.
School
52 Harvard
53 MIT
54
55 Harvard-
England
56 MIT
57 Harvard
Profession
City planning
Naval Engineer
Chemical
engineer
Professor
finance
City planning
City planning
Civil engineer
-soils
Civil engineer
-soils
Mechanical
engineer
Division
engineer
Country
Venezuela
Korea
Thailand
Chile
Indonesia
India
Venezuela
Pakistan
India
Indonesia
Project
Guayana Project
Adviser to Seoul
National Univ. on setting
up naval architecture labs
WHO man at 2 universities;
at 1, help counterpart
set up department; at
other, public health
Give 4-wk. courses to
Chilean businessmen
under Chile's counter-
part to AMA
One of 4 UNTAB technical
advisers in the estab-
lishment of school city
regional planning at
Bandung Tech.
Survey and draw plan for
new seaport and town for
Government Settlement Corp.
Consultant to Creole Petro-
leum on soil dam constr'uc-
tion
Conduct highway feasibility
study for NY firm
Work with Indian govern-
ment (National Council
Applied Economic Res.)
as consultant on training
the staff to do engineer-
ing phase of economics
Advise government Council
of Sciences of setting
up some research institutes
58
59 Harvard Development
advisor-
Pakistan Head of group giving
advice on planning and
staffing to government
of Pakistan
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Profession
60 Harvard
61 MIT
62 Harvard
63 Harvard
BS
64 HBS
65 Harvard
City planning
Civil Engineer
Engineer
Social psy-
chologist
Business ad-
ministration
Indonesia
Venezuela
India
Turkey
India
Education
Indonesia one year for
UN and Venezuela on
Guayana Project.
Administrator of pro-
jects in Latin America
Several projects in India
Several projects in Turkey
Work at the Administrative
Staff College in Hyderabad.
Educational work in Nigeria
Respon-
dent Source Country Project
APPENDIX II
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FORD
I. FACE SHEET DATA
1. A. Name
B. Department
C. How long at ?
D. Rank
E. Area of specialization within discipline
2. A. Age
B. Place of residence (city/town, not specific address)
3. A. We understand you've travelled abroad. Where have
you been? (All trips, excluding vacations in Canada
and Mexico): When? For how long? In what connection?
B. What was the formal description of your job?
C. Do you enjoy foreign travel? IF YES: What about it
appeals to you? IF NO: Why not?
4. A. What newspaper(s) do you read? How often do you
read it (each)?
B. IF NOT INCLUDED ABOVE: Do you read your local
community newspaper? IF YES: How regularly?
C. What magazines (non-professional) do you read?
How often?
5. What are your favorite ways of spending free time? (Hobbies)
6. In the course of your own education, did you take much
work in the social sciences?
IF YES: Did you find this work interesting?
IF NO: Was there any special reason for this?
7. How much long-term consulting or full-time work have
you done in industry or government? In what capacities?
When? For how long? Did you enjoy your work? Why(not)?
II.
1. A. With respect to your work abroad, had you had any
special contact with the country involved prior to
your involvement with the particular project? IF YES:
What sort? (Personal contacts, books, etc.) How
extensive? (Language, travel, etc.) How come?
B. Once you learned that you would be going abroad, did
you make any special effort to inform yourself about
the country? (Not specifically the project itself.)
IF YES: What kinds of efforts? What information
were you most interested in acquiring? How did you
go about acquiring it? IF NO: Why not?
C. With respect to the country itself--forgetting the
project for the time being--did you find that things
conformed pretty generally to your expectations? In
what way(s) did they differ?
D. Did you have trouble with the language barrier?
E. Did you feel uncomfortable when you first arrived?
Did it take long to get adjusted to your new environ-
ment? What things bothered you the most?
F. Where did you live? Were there other Americans in
your vicinity? Did you have much contact with them?
G. How did you spend your free time?
H. Did you get an opportunity to spend much time with
natives of the country, other than those associated with
the project? In what connections? Did you actively
seek such contracts? Were they generally with people
of backgrounds comparable to yours? (IF NO: What
were the most important differences?)
I. Was your family with you? IF YES: What school did
your children attend? Do you think it was a good
experience for your children? Why (not)? Did your
wife find it more difficult to adjust than you? Why (not)?
J. In general, did you enjoy the non-professional part of
your experience? Did you feel that it was valuable?
If you had the chance, would you like to return? (Probe
for reasons on all these).
K. Did you feel any hostility or resentment towards you--
again people with whom you were not professionally asso-
ciated--because you were an American?
L. In general, what do you regard as the most striking
differences between the way of life in ( )
and the way of life in America?
III.
1. A. How did you happen to become involved in this work?
Were you approached, or did you apply?
B. Why did you become interested? Professional reasons?
(What?) Money? Travel? Duty?
2. A. When the job was first described to you, how clearly
were your own responsibilities defined? By whom?
How was it defined? What were you supposed to do?
B. Were things more clear at the time you actually began
working? Had they changed? How come? Were there sub-
sequent changes in your understanding of your own re-
sponsibilities? Were these the result of formal rede-
finition by the sponsors, or of your own interaction
with the problem? What was the nature of the redefini-
tion?
C. Did you, at the beginning of your work, regard the
goals of the job as worthwhile? If you had had the
power, would you have redefined them in any way? In
what way? Did you make any attempts at effecting such
redefinition? What kinds attempts? Were these
successful? Why (not)?
3. A. Once on the scene,did you feel there were things other
than professional competence required for success at
the job? What things? Did these bother you?
B. In your general relationship with your hosts, did
you find it more important for them to like you, or
to respect you? How important were the public rela-
tions aspects of your work? Were these important to
the success of the project? Did you view them as
important on any other grounds?
IV.
1. A. What was the organizational set-up of the project? To
whom were you immediately responsible? Who headed
up the whole operation? What other personnel were
involved? How much tie-up was there with local agen-
cies? With local personnel?
B. What were the most important differences between the
operation of the organization and your own organizational
experiences back in the States? (Why were these important?)
C. In general, were your hosts cooperative? Did they
understand the goals of the project? Did they approve?
Did they provide you with necessary information? Did
they obstruct your work in any way? (Both consciously
and unconsciously.) How easy was it to talk to people
important to the project?
D. Aside from the local personnel with whom you had direct
contact, what was the attitude of the local bureaucracy
to your work? What factors went into determining their
attitude?
E. What about the professional competence of the local
people? Of the other American personnel? Did this
constitute a problem?
2. A. Did you find that you had to spend more time. on adminis-
trative matters than you would. have liked? 1Or, if job
was largely administrative, did you -ind that more-
"dirty work" was demanded of you than you would have liked?)
B. Did you feel that you had to spend much time and/or
energy being an ambassador of good will? (Probes for
role conflict)
C. Did you, in general, find it difficult to adjust to the
new organizational environment? Did you feel uncom-
fortable at first? How long did it take you to feel
"in"? Were the adjustment problems more serious than
they would have been in America?
D. What advice would you/or did you giveto your successor?
E. What recommendations would you make to agency officials
interested in making the transition into the new or-
ganization an easier one?
V. 1. A. Looking back now, do you feel that you successfully
accomplished the job? IF YES: -On -what do you base this
assessment? Would other people involved in the project
agree with you? The sponsors?. The hosts? IF NO:
Why not? Do you feel it was primarily because the job
simply couldn't be done, or was there some reason that
you yourself couldn't do it? "Why? What?
B. In general, did you enjoy your work? Did you find it
rewarding in any way? In what way?
C. If a colleague were offered a similar position, would
you advise him to accept? How would you advise him
to prepare for his mission? Are there any other steps
one might take to increase the efficiency of your
personnel in these kinds of matters?
D. How important to selecting personnel for such tasks
ought each of the following to be deemed? Professional
competence; personal adaptability; organizational ex-
perience; innovativeness; motivation; familiarity with
host country. Anything else? How important was each
of these to your own (lack of) success?
VI. 1. A. In general, would you say that projects such as the one
in which you were involved would stand a greater chance
of success if they were free of political strings, and
professional personnel were provided substantially
greater autonomy? Should the professionals be allowed
to set the goals for projects, as well as being involved
in their implementation?
2. Walt Rostow has suggested that technical and economic deve-
lopment does not occur in a vacuum, but requires parallel
development in the political, social and even psychological
spheres. Would you agree? What kinds of developments in
each of these three areas would you regard as being important
to the problems of technical and economic development?
3. Do you feel that it would be useful in any way to have more
social science research done in the developing countries?
Why (not)? What kinds of questions ought such research be
addressed to?
